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IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEJVIS 
It is generally recognized that countries conducting comprehensive disease surveillance 
in wildlife populations are more likely to understand the epidemiology of specific infec-
tious pathogens and zoonotic disease outbreaks (1,2). These countries are better equipped 
and prepared to develop solutions that will protect humans, agriculture, and wildlife. Con-
sequently, active surveillance for diseases of animal or public health concern in wildlife is 
particularly beneficial to national and international interests. T11e World Organization for 
Animal Health (OrE) encourages all countries to develop and maintain wildlife disease 
surveillance systems, which complement and support human health and agricultural ani-
mal disease programs. These systems should be capable of detecting unusual disease 
events, involve proficient diagnostic laboratories and international reference laboratories, 
use molecular charactelization tools, and have communication protocols in place for 
rep0l1ing results (3). 
Disease surveillance systems should be designed to systematically collect relevant eco-
logical and health-related data on the species of concern, efficiently assimilate and analyze 
data, and disseminate results of the analysis in an appropriate time frame to decision mak-
ers so that management actions can be rapidly implemented. It is this latter characteristic 
. that distinguishes surveillance systems from the more commonly implemented monitOling 
. *ColTesponding Author Email: Thomas.j.DeLiberto@aphis.usda.gov 
DeLiberto et al.: Development of a National Early Detection System for Highly... 157 
systems in the study of wildlife diseases. Monitoring systems are developed to assess the 
health and disease status of a population and often are used to increase understanding of 
pathogens and their epidemiology in the environment. Alternatively, disease surveillance 
systems are more active by definition and incorporate thresholds for disease prevalence or 
incidence, above which, predefined management actions will be implemented (4, 5) .. 
Effective monitoring and surveillance systems (MOSS) form the foundation of all animal 
health programs and the most important component in strategies for preventing emerging 
infectious diseases. 
I 
There are nunierous reasons for developing a MOSS (4, 6, 7, 8, 9). Most MOSS imple-
mented for wildlife species have been designed to evaluate the progress of a disease con-
trol or eradication program (e.g., bovine tuberculosis, chronic wasting disease, rabies). 
Recently though, increased awareness by the international community· of the important 
role wildlife species can have in the emergence and spread of infectious diseases, has led 
to recommendations that wildlife resources be included in nationally coordinated animal 
and human health surveillance programs (3, 9). In particular, there is a need for wildlife to 
be incorporated into early warning systems for emerging infectious diseases (10). Early 
warning systems are a specific type of MOSS focused on detecting the introduction of a 
pathogen into a novel population or region, and rapidly implementing control and com-
munication strategies in targ4t populations if an introduction is detected. 
Relatively few nationally coordinated MOSS for wildlife, and fewer international ones, 
have been implemented. This paucity of wildlife MOSS is directly related to the,difficul-
ties associated with working with free-ranging animals, such as obtaining diagnostic sam-
ples and quantifying disease in a wildlife population (11). If biological samples are 
obtained, storage and transport from remote locations are challenging, especially if testing 
protocols require maintenance of a cold chain. The lack of validated diagnostic tests' on 
wild species and laboratories skilled in conducting such tests also are limited (12, 13). All 
.. of these difficulties are further complicated by varying perceptions of ownership land man-
agement jurisdictions of wildlife (14). 
Here we desclibe the development and implementation of a nationally coordinated, lisk-
based MOSS for detecting highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) into the USA 
through wild birds. We also demonstrate how collaboration with Canada and Mexico 
expanded each country's programs into an effective North American early detection system. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK·BASED MOSS IN 
'VILD BIRDS FOR HPAIH5Nl 
At the direction of the USA Homeland Security Council, the United States Departments 
of Agriculture (USDA) and Interior (DOl) convened a working group comprised of 
-wildlife biologists, veterinarians, virologists, and public health experts to develop and 
Interagency Strategic Plan (Strategic Plan) to address the tlu-eat of a potential introduction 
of HPAIV HsNJ into the USA by wild migratory birds (15). This Strategic Plan described 
the essential components of a unified national early detection system (NEDS) for HPAIV 
in migratory birds. \J\Thi1e the immediate concern was a potential introduction ofthe HsNJ 
SUbtype into the USA the NEDS \vas developed to detect any HPAIV in wild birds, and 
increase knowledge regarding low pat110genic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) in these 
species. The Strategic Plan has been used to develop flyway and state-specific implemen-
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tation plans for BPAIV surveillance by establishing guidelines consisting of standardized 
protocols for sampling wild birds, handling and shipping samples, diagnostic testing, and 
communicating results. 
The Strategic Plan provides a conceptual framework for a risk-based MOSS. These· 
MOSS apply risk assessment methods to traditional surveillance designs for early detec-
tion and management of diseases, and support strategic and operational decision making 
(4, 16,17). The objectives are to identify the necessary components of surveillance to pro-
tect animal and human health, plioritize those requirements, and effectively and efficient-
ly allocate available resources. The steps in the design of a risk-based MOSS are 1) selec-
tion of the disease agent, 2) selection of sampling strata, 3) selection of sample size and 
sampling methodology 4) selection or development of a data management system, and 5) 
development of an action plan if a priori conditions are realized. 
Selection of the Disease Agent 
After movement of BPAIV B5N1 out of southeast Asia and into the Qinghai province 
of China, Mongolia, and eventually into Europe and Africa in 2005, considerable interna-
tional effort focused on controlling HPAIV B5N1 in endemic countries and preventing fur-
ther spread. The USA, along with many other countries, began evaluating the risk of 
HPAlV B5NI introduction. In its National Strategy for Pandemic Influenia (18), the USA 
recognized that the BPAIV B5N1virus had already obtained the ability to infect a wide 
variety of hosts and would likely continue to spread. Although it was impossible to deter-
mine whether BPAlV B5NI would evolve into 'a human pandemic, the presence of the 
virus in domestic and wild birds in Asia and Europe increased the likelihood of its contin-
ued spread. Consequently, an implementation plan was developed to reduce the risk of the 
virus from entering the USA, limit its spread if the virus did enter the country, and sustain 
infrastructure and mitigate impacts if a pandemic developed (19). 
The USA recognized that the greatest risk of introduction was from the illegal importa-
tion of poultry and poultry products, and through the illegal trade of wild and exotic birds. 
Consequently, border protection and. domestic bird surveillance programs already in place 
were strengthened to meet the increased risk of the rapidly spreading BPAIV H5N1 sub-
type (19). The risk that wild birds could move the BPAIV H5NI subtype into the country 
also was identified; wild birds likely played a role in moving the virus into the Qinghai 
province of China, Mongolia and western Europe (20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26). While stud-
ies on avian influenza viruses CAIV) in wild birds have been conducted in North America 
(23, 27), these were limited in geographic scope and not designed to provide early warn-
ing of new virus introductions. Therefore, entry of the virus into the USA via wild birds 
was identified as a critical risk factor requiring increased surveillance (Homeland Securi-
ty Council 2006). 
Selection of Sampling Strata 
The Strategic Plan stratifies the USA wild bird metacommunity geographically, by 
species that are likely to exhibit heterogeneity in the probability of moving HPAlV into the 
USA, and by the heterogeneity in the severity of consequence if an individuaJ is infected 
with HPAIV. State and federal wildlife management agencies further refined these sam-
pling strata to prioritize areas and species within flyways. 
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Stratification by Geographic Region 
Sampling for HPAIV in wild birds was stratified longitudinally to account for genera 
migratory patterns across the continent. Although intraspecific and interspecific variabiJi. 
ty in migratory pathways are common (28, 29, 30), the traditional waterfowl flyways (i.e. 
Atlantic, Mississippi, Central and Pacific) were used as a template in evaluating the ris1 
of HPAIV H5Nl introduction through migratory birds on a continental scale. These fly. 
ways are associated with major topographical features in North America, which also tene 
. to be aligned along a north-south axis (31, 32). Theii boundaries are defined adrninistra· I 
tively, and are not biologically fixed or sharply delineated (Figure 1). Some species sud 
as the mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) use specific flyways, while individuals of othel 
species such as the northern pintail (Anas acuta) migrate across flyways during fall anc 
spring (33). 
I?aolk flyWay 
C~n.tra~ P lJ~v.v.ay 
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The Pacific and Central Flyways extend from the Russian Far East, Alaska, and western 
Arctic Canada, through coastal and western regions of Canada, the USA and Mexico, and. 
on to Central and South America (Figure 1). These Flyways were considered the regions 
through which the introduction of HPAIV H5Nl most likely would occur by wild birds. 
Many migratory species that nest in·the Arctic regions of the Russian Far East, Alaska, and 
Canada follow the Pacific and, to a lesser degree, the Central Flyways to wintering areas 
in North and South America (34, 35). The overlap at the northern end of these flyways, 
and in Hawaii and Oceania establishes a pathway fm'potential disease transmission across 
continents and for mixing, re-assortment, and exchange of genetic material among strains 
from Eurasia and North America (36). 
The Atlantic and Mississippi Flyways extend from the arctic regions of eastern Canada 
and western Greenland through the eastern regions of the USA (31). While the risk of 
HPAIV H5Nl introduction through migratory birds was considered higher in the Pacific 
and Central Flyways, potential introduction of the virus through the Atlantic and Missis.-
sippi Flyways was also of concern. Some species such as the northern pintail and tundra 
swan (Cygn.us colwnbianus) migrate across several flyways during fall and spring (31, 33, 
37). Also, there is geographic overlap of breeding birds in these flyways with birds from 
the East Atlantic Flyway (23), although the degree of overlap of species and individuals is 
, 
considerably less than occurs in flyways of the Pacific region (37, 38). However, birds that 
winter in Europe and Africa where HPAIV H5N1 occurs, or co-mingle with birds from 
infected areas, have overlapping breeding areas with birds from North America. Makaro-
va et a1. (38) and Spackman et a1. (39) demonstrated that at least some North American 
isolates· belonged to Eurasian lineages. 
Finally, although HPAIV H5Nl had not been detected in the western hemisphere, the 
potential for wild birds to move the virus north if it was introduced into Central and South 
America was considered. Thus, the Strategic Plan provided a national framework for 
HPAIV HSN1 surveillance in wild birds, which recommended that regional flyway plans 
be developed. These flyway plans were further refined into individual state implementa-
tion plans, such that all the potential routes of entry for BPAIV H5Nl through migratory 
birds could be monitored. 
Stratification by Species 
Initially, species were prioritized by their relative risk of introducing HPAIV HSNI into 
the USA. During the development of the Strategic Plan in 2005, no information was avail-
able on the ability of North American species to become infected with, shed; or spread the 
virus over short or long distances. While there was considerable research available on 
LPAIV in some species, the unprecedented affects of the HSNI subtype in wild birds 
throughout Asia clearly challenged the conventional wisdom that BPAIV did not signifi-
cantly impact these natural reservoir species. Consequently, migratory species from Nm1h 
America that spent part of their life cycle in endemic HPAIV H5NI areas were of highest 
concern, regardless of whether they were known LPAIV reservoirs. ' 
To fm1her focus sampling, five criteria were employed to quantitatively rank these 
migratory species. Ranking criteria included proportion of the population occurring in 
Asia, contact with an area known to have BPAIV H5Nl, habitats used in Asia, population 
size, and ·likelihood of obtaining a representative sample of sufficient size (l5). These 
I-
I 
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rankings were llsed to produce priority species lists for apparently healthy bird sampling 
in Alaska and the North American flyways. Flyways and agencies refined these lists by 
adding additional species of concern. 
Stratification by Severity of Consequence 
The HPAlV HSNI sUbtype has caused the death of individuals from a wide variety of 
wild species (40), and most detections in wild birds have been through morbidity and mor-
tality events (23,41). Systematic investigation of tb,ese events in wild birds seems to offer 
the highest and earliest probability of detecting HPAlV HSNI if it is introduced by wild 
birds (8, 15,42). Benefits gained from conducting disease investigations of wildlife mor-
tality events are not unique to AIV Many diseases have been identified through the 
wildlife disease investigation process (43, 44, 4S). Investigation of morbidity and mortal-
ity events also provides management recommendations that can mitigate or reduce addi-
tional deaths in wildlife. 
Unfortunately, comprehensive surveillance of morbidity and mortality events is prob-
lematic, even in countries with established programs. This is primarily due to the difficul-
ties associated with the detection of sick and dead wild animals, and the submission of car-
casses or samples to a diagnostic laboratory (11, 12). Most morbidity and mortality events 
in wild birds go undetected because they involve few individuals, occur in areas of low 
human densities, or quickly become unavailable for sampling due to predation, scaveng-
ing, or rapid autolysis (46, 47,48,49,50,51,52,53). Such biases can significantly influ-
ence the perceived distribution of disease (54). Additionally, evidence for the evolution of 
HPAIV H5Nl strains that are not pathogenic to particular species of wild birds is mount-
ing (21, 55, 56, 57, 58) .. Recent experimental research demonstrated that some species are 
resistant to developing clinical signs from HPAIV H5Nl infection (59, 60), while other 
. studies documented even susceptible species can be clinically protected by previous expo-
sure to AlV (61, 62). For these reasons, it is difficult to quantify and assess morbidity and 
mortality surveillance with regard to disease detection. Consequently, surveillance sys-
tems also should employ active (e.g., apparently healthy bird) as well as passive (e.g., 
morbidity/mortality event) sampling techniques (4,9,63,64). 
Selection of Sample Size and Sampling Methodology 
Sample Size 
Determination of sample size depends on statistical (e.g., population size, power, confi-
dence, test accuracy, etc.) as well as non-statistical factors (e.g., funding, human resources, 
access to sampling units, etc.). The Strategic Plan provided guidance for agencies con-
ducting surveillance for HPAlV H5Nl, but recognized that specific implementation plans 
should be devele>ped for each flyway and state. Population estimates for species of inter-
est vary by location, time of year, and sampling method employed. Sample stratification 
b}1 flyway and state within flyway reduces the effects of this variability. However, such 
stratification requires agencies to coordinate their sampling efforts to assure that adequate 
sample sizes are obtained from each target species within each flyway and state. 
Estimation of sample size for morbidity and mortaEty events were not recommended in 
the Strategic Plan. Agencies were encouraged to identify and sample as many of these 
events as possible. Guidance on determining the number of samples for apparently bealthy 
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bird surveillance were based on the equation: n = log (I-c) / log (I-P), where n is the sam-
ple size, c is the desired level of confidence, and P is the prevalence of positi ve samples in 
the population. An adequate sample size should allow for ;0:95% confidence that AIV is 
detected at ;;1.5% prevalence in an infinite population. Thus, a mininmm of 200 samples 
should be collected from the population of interest based on an assumed prevalence of 
1.5% of HPAIV H5N1. This formula assumes 100% test sensitivity and specificity, which· 
is rarely achieved; at the initiation of the USA HPAIV Wild Bird NEDS, reliable estimates 
of test sensitivity and specificity were. not available for the species of concern. Also, this 
calculation assumes that if HPAIV were in the population, all individuals would have an 
equal probability. of being infected, which would be highly unlikely. 
Stratification by fly'way and species helped to reduce the impact of non-random distrib-
. ution of species and risk of infection. These impacts were further reduced by prioritizing 
states within flyways based on 1) historic disease prevalence, 2) species-specific migrato-
. ry pathways, 3) geographic size and location of each state, 4) wetland habitat and location 
in relation to shoreline, 5) expert input from the Flyway Councils and the Association of 
Fish & Wildlife Agencies, and 6) bird-band recovery data. Annual target sample numbers 
were highest for Alaska followed by priority Levels 1-3 states, respectively (Figure 2). 







-'-, .. { 
4-->.f 
Figure 2: Priority ranking of st.ates for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5NI detection in wild 
birds. Sampling goals were highest in Alaska followed by Levels 1-3 states, respectively. 
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list until state-wide target numbers were achieved. Agencies within each state decided 
which species from the flyway priority list to sample. 
Total sample sizes ultimately were determined by available funding and prioritization of 
states. During the first year of the Wild Bird BPAlV NEDS, $29 million dollars were made 
available tbJ:ough the USDA and DOr, resulting in a national target of 150,000 wild bird 
and environmental fecal samples. Unfortunately, available funding decreased in subse-
quent years resulting in a corresponding decrease in target sample numbers to 64,000 by 
the 200.9 sampling year. 
Sampling Methodology 
Investigation of Morbidity and Mortality Events The success of this strategy requires 
early detection and assessment of events, rapid submission of samples to qualified diag-
nostic laboratories, rapid testing, immediate reporting of diagnostic results, and rapid 
implementation of pre-established response protocols. The USA strategy capitalizes on 
existing morbidity and mortality surveillance programs by state and federal agencies; 
some of these programs have been in place for decades (e.g., surveillance at i11igratory 
waterfowl refuges), and others (e.g., West Nile virus monitoring programs) are relatively 
new (65, 66, 67). These programs use agency personnel as well as the public to detect and 
report events to trained wildlife disease investi'gators. Investigations related to morbidity 
and mortality events are conducted regardless of the time of year, type of species involved, 
number of species involved, or the number of samples previously collected in the state. 
Assessment of these events, and collection and shipment of samples to diagnostic labora-
tories are usually made within 24 hours of identifying the incident. Diagnostic testing and 
reporting results are completed V'lithin an additional 72 hours allowing for rapid imple-
mentation of response protocols. 
The USA has enhanced its capabilities to respond to morbidity and mortality events by 
increasing personnel and resources dedicated to detection, investigation, and reporting of 
sick and dead birds. Training courses designed to increase the number of wildlife profes-
sionals qualified to investigate morbidity and mortality events were conducted, education-
al materials were provided to sportsmen, bird watchers, and the general public to increase 
reporting of events, and a national telephone hotline was established to report dead birds. 
Surveillance in Apparently Healthy Birds Two strategies' for sampling apparently 
. healthy wild birds are recommended in the USA Strategic Plan: hunter-harvest and live-
bird sampling. Similar to morbidity and mortality event sampling. each of these strategies 
has advantages and disadvantages. Successful implementation of these strategies is time 
and location specific . 
. Hunter-Harvest Sampling Regulated hUllting of '\vild migratory birds by sportsmen 
and subsistence harvests by Native Americans occur throughout most of North America. 
The primary advantage to hunter-harvest sampling is its cost-effectiveness: most of the 
waterfowl species in North America are cJassifiec1 as game birds, existing infrastructure 
(e.g., game check stations) i~ in place in many migratory and wintering areas, and suffi-
cient numbers of birds are harvested by hunters, decreasing the amount of time and 
resources requirec110 obtain samples. 
The main disadvantages to hunter-harvest sampling are that 11ot<:d] species are harves[-
ed and hUllting seasons only occur at specific times of the year (e.g .. September tl1Tough 
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January). Also, although sport hunting is widely distributed throughout North America, 
specific areas receive little to no hunting pressure because of low hunter density or it is 
prohibited by reguiatiQn (e.g., urban areas, preserves, private property). Finally, managers 
may not have access to all harvested birds, and reliable collection site information may not 
be available for samples collected. 
Live~Bird Sampling Live-bird sampling involves capturing, sampling, and releasing 
wild birds. This strategy is often time and labor intensive requiring trained personnel, 
which can result in a significant financial investment. However, if implemented properly, 
live-bird sampling provides valuable data toward a comprehensive surveillance system. 
An important advantage cif this strategy is that it can be implemented at specific sites 
and at ~my time of the year birds are present. For example, many species of Charadri-
iformes are not hunted and hunting of game species within urbai1 areas is not possible. Vir-
tually ariy species of interest can be targeted, but the technique requires trained biologists 
to operate specific trap types as well as properly handling targeted species to prevent injury 
and death. 
Sentinel Species Sentinel ducks have been used effectively to determine the presence 
of AIV and timing of infection associated with the an-ivaI of wild migratory waterfowl in 
wetland habitats (68, 69,70,71,72,73,74,75). An additional advantage of using sentinel 
bird surveillance is its applicability in areas (e.g., urban areas) in which other methods can 
not be used. Disadvantages include the expense of rearing disease-free birds, pen con-
struction, and husbandry. Sentinel flocks also are subject to predation and human distur-
bance. Another important consideration is that the susceptibility of individlwls and species 
vary among AIV subtypes (59, 60, 62, 76, 77) 
As with the other methods used for apparently healthy bird surveillance, targeting a sen-
tinel system for HPAIV H5Nl can be challenging given the lack of knowledge about this 
virus in North American species and ecosystems. Consequently, it was recommended that 
agencies use AIV-free birds from species on the flyway, priority list, and target specific 
locations where, and periods when, sentinel animals are likely to interact with free-rang-
ing individuals of high priority species. \ 
Fecal Sampling Avian influenza viruses are generally transmitted by waterfowl through 
the intestinal tract and viable virus can be detected in feces (78, 79). Analyses of fecal mate-
lial from waterfowl habitat can provide evidence of AIV circulating in wild bird populations, 
the specific subtypes present, pathogenicity, and possible lisks to poultry and susceptible 
livestock (80, 81, 82). Collection of fecal samples from watelfowl habitat is a reasonably 
cost effective method of surveillance compared to live bird sampling. Fecal sampling does 
not require the same level of skill to implement as live-bird sampling and can be.imple-
mented in mral,and urban habitats. However, wild bird fecal samples must be fresh (e.g., 
before desiccation and extended exposure to sunlight), may contain environmental contam-
inants that adversely impact diagnostic analyses, and can be difficult to obtain fro111 some 
species of waterlawl· that spend considerable amount of time foraging and defecating in 
. water. Exceptions are species such as Canada geese (Branta canadeJISis) and Snow geese 
(Chen caerulescens) that primmil y forage and defecate on land. Additionally, while detec-
tion of AIV in fecal samples are useful in determining the presence of these viruses in the 
environment, the species infected may be difficult to determine if the collector does not 
observe the birds defecating. In the event of a HPAIV detection in feces, these limitations 
I 
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will require subsequent sampling of the wild bird populations in the area to allow for pre-
dictions of viral spread and assessing risks of transmission to poultry and humans. 
Diagnostics and Case Definition. 
Swab samples were collected from wild birds (i.e., tracheal, oropharyngeal, cloacal) and 
wild bird fecal samples. Bird samples were screei1ed at one of 43 participating National 
Animal Health Laboratory Network facilities. This network is a partnership of state and 
federal laboratories that have been certified by the National Veterinary Services Laborato-
ries (NVSL), which is the OlE Reference Laboratory for AIV diagnostics in the USA. 
Swabs were initially tested by real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction 
(rRT-PCR) using the matrix gene assay (83). The matrix gene rRT-PCR assay was capable 
of detecting all 16 hemagglutinin and nine neuraminidase sUbtypes. I'1atrix generRT-PCR-
positive samples were further characterized by H5- and H7-specific rRT-PCR assays (84). 
Positive H5 or H7 rRT-PCR samples were express shipped to the NVSL within 24 hrs of 
a presumptive finding (85). Specific rRT-PCR assays, virus isolation, subtyping, and path-
ogenicity tests were performed according to international guidelines (9, 86, 87). 
Wild bird fecal samples were screened by rRT-PCR at the USDA Wildlife Services 
National Wildlife Research Center using a modified assay based on Spackman et al. (88). 
Positive H5 and H7 samples were forwarded to the NVSL for virus isolation, subtyping, 
and pathogenicity testing as described above. Additional sUbtyping was performed by 
amplifying hemagglutinin genes and sequencing analysis (89). 
A confirmed positive sample, was ·one from which a HPAIV was isolated and resulted 
in a positive pathogenicity test. A sample collected from a mortality event and which test-
ed positive on the rRT-PCR matrix and H5 or H7 assay were considered presumptive pos-
itive until virus isolation and pathogenicity testing could be performed by the NVSL. A 
case was considered suspect if a sample from an apparentl)' healthy bird tested positive on 
the rRT-PCR matrix and H5 or H7 assay. 
Development of a Data Management System 
One of the biggest challenges of developing a national MOSS for the early detection of 
a disease is the rapid assimilation of data and the transmission of relevant information to 
decision makers. Sampling and diagnostic testing often requires the coordination of 
numerous government agencies and laboratolies, which have pre-existing data manage-
ment programs they are required to use. Differences in the objectives of these databases, 
security requirements and protocols, and software upon which they are based often inhib-
it the ability to electronically transfer data among tbe MOSS participants. These con-
straints can severely limit the integration, analysis, and dissemination of information to 
decision makers in an appropriate time frame. In the case of an early detection system, 
rapid identification and dissemination of informa6011 Te]ated to an introduction of an exot-
ic disease is critical for effective]y and efficiently implementing a management p]an to 
contro] and eliminate a pathogen. Tbus, a system tllalmanages input of data through mul-
tiple routes and provides a secure platform for contributing partners is a necessity. 
The DO] and USDA developed the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Ear]y Detection 
Data System (HEDDS) to manage animal and specimen data taken by federal and state 
wildlife management agencies participating in the ,Nild Bird HPAIV NEDS. The HEDDS 
al10ws for either direct clata enlry or the electronic transfer of surveillance clata hom exist-
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ing databases. Also, a listing of wild bird mortality events nationwide details information 
on causes of wildlife mortalities. If HPAlV is detected in wild birds, the system could be 
used to provide specific information regarding the number of species and individuals sam-
pled and their infection status. While HEDDS maintains a secure platform for compiling 
specific agency clata. it also has an open-access internet site that enables the public to track 
the progress of the Wild Bird HPAIV NEDS (90). 
Development of Action Plans 
An.Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (19) clarifies 
the roles and responsibilities of government and non-government entities in the event of a 
HPAIV H5Nl detection in the USA. This Implementation Plan also outlines actions and 
expectations of federal, state, and tribal entities .for preparedness and communication, sur-
veillance and detection, and response and containment for protecting animal as well 'as 
human health. 
Based on this Implementation Plan, the USDA, DOl, Departments of Health and Human 
Services, Defense, and Homeland Security, and state and tribal partners have adopted a 
common response strategy for an outbreak of HEA.lV H5Nl in domestic and wild birds 
(86). This strategy involves intensified surveillance, containment, coordinated interagency 
situational assessment, and activating or supporting an interagency unified command 
when needed. The USDA and DOl have incol1Jorated the principles of this strategy into 
agency specific response plans (86, 91). These response plans were tested through table-
top exercises of hypothetical HPAIV H5Nl outbreaks in wild birds independent of, and in 
association with, poultry outbreaks. Exercises tested and integrated field, laboratory, and 
policy resources along with Incident Command Systems at the local, regional, and natlon-
allevels. 
Unlike actions developed to protect domestic animal and human health, management 
actions in wild birds are limited. Wild birds, are not subject to disease containment 
controls as are clomestic birds and people. Therefore, management options for wild birds 
after a detection of HPAIV should focus on mitigating the potential spread to domestic 
birds and humans .. 
If a HPAIV outbreak in poultry is detected, wildlife managers should assess the presence 
of susceptible wildlife in the affected area, the potential for spread of tbe virus to those 
species, develop a surveillance protocol to determine if tbe virus has spread to wildlife, 
and determine if wildlife are moving the virus outside of the affected area. Managers 
should minimize tbe risk of wildlife becoming infected on positive farms, by integrating a 
variety of techniques (e.g., hazing, fencing, etc.) to exclude wildlife from those premises. 
Additionally, managers must evalLfate whether public land ciosures are prudent to prevent 
~ispersal of the virus by humans visiting areas where the virus is known to occur. 
Public support for response activities is essential for success. The general public. includ-
ing VariOL)S constituency groups such as consumptive and non-consumptive wildlife users, 
farmei's, and animal welfare advocates, will be affected by a HPAIV outbreak. Information-
al brochures on the role of wild birds in the transmission of AIV have been developed by 
USDA and have been distributed to producers, and industry and hunter organizations. 
Communication plans for notifying state and rederal partners of HPAJV findings were devel-
oped and distributed to state agriculture and wildlife agencies, and diagnostic laboratories. 
, I 
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Il\1PLElVIENTATION OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN 
The USDA and DOl were the lead federal agencies responsible for working with tribal 
and state partners to implement the Strategic Plan. Facilitation and coordination of all part-
ners in the Wild Bird BPAIV NEDS was through a Steering Committee consisting of rep-
resentatives from the USDA Wildlife Services, DOl Geological Survey and Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Centers for Disease Control, Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies,. 
and National Flyway Council. In addition to ensuring that all partners were kept apprised 
of the progress of each agency's efforts, the Steering Committee also served as the prima-
ry body through which partners discussed proposed changes in the Wild Bird BPAIV 
NEDS. Through the Steering Committee, consistency in the multi-agency Wild Bird 
BPAIV NEDS was maintained. 
From 1 April 2006 through 31 March 2009, the USA collected 367,834 wild bird and 
wild bird fecal samples for testing as part of the Wild Bird BPAIV NEDS (85). More than 
250 species of wild birds in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the USA Pacific and Caribbean 
territories were sampled (85, 92, 93, 94). No BPAIV was detected in any wild bird sam-
ple. DeLiberto et al. (85) conducted a post hoc freedom of disease analysis (95) to test the 
null hypothesis that BPAlV was present in the USA wild bird metacommunity. Given an 
estimated population size of 50 million ducks, geese, and swans (96, 97, 98), the freedom 
from disease analysis indicated that the probability of observing a BPAIV positive reac-
tor in a sample of 367,834 wild birds with a disease prevalence of 0.001 % was p = 
0.000000 (85). 
About 52% of the samples were collected from the Pacific (including Alaska and Ocea-
nia) and Central Flyways and 42% from the Mississippi and Atlantic Flyways. Sampling 
in Alaska alone, accounted for 15% of all samples collected throughout the USA. Several 
authors implied the USA Wi1d Bird BPAIV NEDS focused entirely on the Asia-Alaska 
route of entry, with little to no wild bird surveillance in other potential pathways of intro-
duction (99, 100, 101). These results demonstrate that the Wild Bird BPAlY NEDS effec-
tively achieved its goal of targeting a potential entry of the virus from Asia, but not at the 
exclusion of other possible routes (e.g., Europe). . 
While sick and dead birds accounted for only 2 % of total samples collected, they repre-
sented a significant and increasing investment by the agencies to identify morbidity and 
mortality events each year. This increased effort, though, resulted in the collection of rel-
atively consistent sick and dead bird samples during 2006 (2,224 samples) and 2007 
(2,276 samples), and a 38-40% decrease in samples during 2008 (1,382 samples) over pre-
vious years. These relatively low sample sizes exemplify the problems associated with 
using morbidity and mortality events in a wildlife MOSS. These events are generally sto-
chastic, unpredictable, and when they do occur,' are difficult to detect especially in areas 
of sparse human population (54). 
Freedom from disease analyses conducted using only the morbidity and mortality sur-
veillance data concluded that the USA wild bird population was free from HPAIV infec-
tion at a minimum prevalence of 0.21 % in 2006 and 2007, and 0.34% in 2008 (p::::O.002). 
Although this is a relatively good level of detection compared to other early detection sys-
tems (42), there could have been 100,000 birds in 2006 and 2007, and 170.000 birds in 
2008 infected with the HPAIV that went undetected if the USA relied solely 011 morbidity 
and mortality event surveillance. 
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Apparently healthy bird sampling (i.e., live-bird and hunter-harvest) comprised 75% of 
all samples collected. There has been much debate conceming the value of apparently 
healthy bird surveillance for the detection of HPAlV H5N 1 (8,63, 102, 103). Freedom from 
disease analysis using only apparently healthy bird data provided the capability of detect-
ing the disease at a much lower prevalence (P<O.OOOOI %; p::;O.OOOOOO) than morbidity and 
mortality surveillance. Consequently, apparently healthy bird surveillance allowed for the 
detection of HPAIV if <5 birds out of a population of 50 million were infected. 
While sampli11g sick and dead birds has detected the vast majority of the wild bird infec-
tions to date, the freedom from disease analyses demonstrate the value of incorporating 
apparently health bird surveillance into NEDS. Comprehensive MOSS for HPAlV H5Nl 
in wild birds that use morbidity and mortality, and apparently healthy bird data are also 
important given the emergence of several strains of this virus (104) and the ability of some 
individuals from some wild bird species to survive infection (57, 59, 75,). These systems 
also are useful in identifying carrier species, potenti'al bridge species and contribute holis-
tic knowledge of AIV ecology (23, 85, 94, 105, 106, 107, 108). 
Development and implementation of the USA Wild Bird HPAIV NEDS has provided 
important ancillary benefits toward improved comprehensive wildlife disease surveillance. 
The number of wildlife biologists trained to investigate morbidity and mortality events, 
and to conduct active surveillance programs for diseases was increased nationwide. Diag-
nostic laboratories certified to conduct AIV testing as pmt of the National Animal Health 
Laboratory Network were increased, improving the capability of the USA to rapidly detect 
introductions of HPAlV as well as other exotic diseases. Enhanced communication proto-
cols for reporting test results of diseases of concern in wildlife were developed and imple-
mented. Critical field equipment necessary for conducting disease surveillance in wildlife . 
and to respond to disease outbreaks was purchased. A national wild bird tissue archive was' 
created by USDA to provide a resource for future studies on AIV and other diseases. Final-
ly, the benefits of improved coordination among wildlife biologists and veterinarians, agri-
cultural veterinarians, laboratory diagnosticians, public health officials, and researchers 
can not be underestimated. This coordination has already proved invaluable in detecting, 
diagnosing, and improving our understanding of the epidemiology of other wildlife dis-
eases (l09). These enhancements to the wildlife disease surveillance efforts in the USA 
will continue to safeguard the health of wild and domestic animals, as well as the public. 
The USA effort, combined with the Canadian (110) and Mexican NEDS, represented the 
largest, coordinated wildlife disease surveillance program ever implemented. During 
2006-09, over 379,000 samples were collected from wild birds throughout North Ameri-
ca and results were shared among all three countries. Coordination of each country's sur-
veillance system was accomplished through the establishment of a tlilateral HPAIV work-
ing group in 2006. This group met periodically to re-evaluate the continental surveillance 
of AlV s in wild birds, and ensured an appropriate sampling distribution in all four flyways 
given available resources. 
The North Amedcan NEDS were supplemented with collaborative surveillance systems 
in eastern Russia, Greenland, and Iceland. The USDA worked closely with the Russian Fed-
eral Centre for Animal Health and Ministry of Natura,] Resources to conduct sampling for' 
AIV in snow geese on Wrangel Island Nature Reserve. Most snow geese that breed on· 
Wrangel Island migrate through Alaska and Canada, and winter in the western USA (110, 
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" Ill). In Greenland, the USDA collaborated with the Technical University of Denmark, 
Aarhus University, the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration, and the Greenland 
Home Rule authorities to conduct AIV surveillance of wild birds in the westem and south- . 
ern portion of the country; since 2007, over 3,000 birds have been tested. Finally, the Cana-
dian Cooperative Wildlife Health Center conducted surveillance for AIV s in wild birds in 
Iceland (12). These efforts, combined with the programs in Canada, Mexico, and the USA, 
provided comprehensive surveillance of migratory birds in the North A,merican flyways. 
SUMlYIARY 
The USA Strategic Plan successfully developed and implemented the Wild Bird HPAlV 
NEDS. TIlls nationally coordinated system was a targeted, risk-based MOSS that system-
atically collected relevant ecological and AIV data on wild birds, efficiently assimilated 
data, and rapidly disseminated results to partner agencies, decision makers, and the pub-
lic. This system capitalized on existing infrastructure and expertise at state and federal 
agriculture and natural resources agencies. The integrated, targeted approach used several 
parallel surveillance activities that provided statistically-based evidence on the absence of 
the HPAIV from the wild bird metacommunity. . 
Standardized data collection protocols were developed to ensure the consistency and 
quality of samples collected. The NAHLN facilities were used to implement rapid screen-
ing for HS and H7 viruses, which were molecularly characterized and tested for patho-
genicity by the NVSL. Partner agencies provided collection data to a common database, 
which was used to provide status upda.tes to the public and decision makers on the progress 
of the system in achieving annual sampling targets. 
Interagency cooperation and communication was maintained through the Steering Com-
mittee, ensuring consistency and reliability in data collection, processing, and reporting. 
Flexibility in the Wild Bird HPAIV NEDS also was ensured by the Steering Committee, 
which periodically met to discuss recent advances in knowledge of HPAIV HSNl virolo-
gy, detection, and ecology. Proposed changes to the system were vetted thl"ough the Steer-
ing Committee and agreed upon by representatives from the partner agencies. 
Continued implementation of the Wild Bird HPAIV NEDS will provide the USA with 
confidence that if introduction of a HPAIV virus in these species occurs, predefined man-
agement activities will be effectively employed to limit viral spread to poultry and humans. 
Future analyses of the surveillance data also will improve our knowledge of AIV in wild 
birds at large geographic and temporal scales. This knowledge will dramatically improve 
our ability to assess risk of HPAIV introductions to poultry and human populations. 
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